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I. INTRODUCTION
The presumption that an employment relationship for an
indefinite period is terminable at the will of either party is uniquely a
product of the American common law.1 This "employment at will"
rule was intended to assure managerial autonomy and discretion in the
work place by permitting employers to discharge their employees at
any time and for any reason.' The rule was so well received in the
laissez-faire climate of the late nineteenth century3 that it was codified
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1. See Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 252 (Ariz. 1986); see also Magnan v.
Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 783 (Conn. 1984) (noting that "English courts [held] that a
contract of employment for an indefinite duration was presumptively for a term of one year");
Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment
at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 243 n.79 (1984).
2. The rule "is commonly referred to as 'employment at will' and 'terminable at will."'
Michael T. Zoretic, Comment, Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence: Washington Gives At Will
Employees a Gun with No Ammunition to Fight Against Unjust Dismissal, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 709, 710 n.2 (1991). The "classic statement" of the rule is that an employer may discharge
an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong." Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211 (N.D.
1987) (quoting Payne v. Western At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)); see also Zoretic, supra note 2, at 711-12
n.8.
3. See Wagner, 722 P.2d at 252-53. See generally Zoretic, supra note 2, at 712 ("The at will
doctrine was ideally suited to the economic conditions extant during its emergence: rapid business
expansion westward lured many employees away from their previous jobs, temporary agricultural
jobs were still common, and most workers did not spend long periods working for a single
employer.").
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in several states,4 and, for a time, almost attained constitutional
standing.'
The basic assumption underlying the employment at will rule is
that employers should have complete contractual freedom6 in order to
facilitate industrial growth in accordance with free market principals.7
Proponents of the rule argue that it enhances the contractual freedom
of employees.' Others contend that the disparity in bargaining power
between employers and employees makes true freedom of contract
illusory in the employment context.9 It is largely the latter view that
has prevailed."0 Thus, although the employment at will rule thrived
for many years, and is still followed in some form by most jurisdic-
4. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (Harrison 1990);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1952); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 601-3 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1993), that has been
modified, but apparently not abrogated, by the enactment of the nation's first comprehensive
wrongful discharge legislation. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994).
5. See Bernard v. IMI Sys., 618 A.2d 338, 343 (N.J. 1993) ("At its height of acceptance, the
employment-at-will doctrine achieved almost constitutional status as the Supreme Court found
support for it in the Due Process Clause.") (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914) and
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 61 (1907)); Jane P. Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge and the
Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 651 (1986).
6. The employment at will rule has been described as "at best a rule of construction," as
opposed to a substantive limitation on the parties' freedom to contract. Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 173 (Ariz. 1984).
7. See Walsh v. Arrow Air, 629 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); 9A Labor
Relations Reporter (BNA), Indiv. Empl. Rts. Man. 505:1 (1991).
8. See Magnan, 479 A.2d at 784; but see Zoretic, supra note 2, at 712 n.12 ("Earl[y] ...
courts were not so much concerned with freedom of the employee, but with the fundamental right
of employers to discharge employees as they pleased.").
9. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1411-12 (1967):
Only the unusually valuable employee has sufficient bargaining power to obtain a
guarantee that he will be discharged ... only for "just cause." It seems fair to estimate
that only a very small portion of the non-unionized employees in this country have
succeeded in so altering the presumptively at will nature of the employment relationship.
See also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981) ("With the rise
of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively immobile workers
who often have no other place to market their skills, recognition that the employer and employee
do not stand on equal footing is realistic.").
10. See Walsh, 629 So. 2d at 146 ("[C]ourts and lawmakers learned over the years that the
mutuality of obligations rationale is based on a false premise of equal bargaining power between
employees at-will and employers, and that the rule is inadequate to protect employees' interests.");
9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Indiv. Empl. Rts. Man. 505:2 (1991) ("Present-day economic relations
between employer and employee do not justify the harshness of the [employment at will] rule...
[because] freedom of contract does not exist between parties of grossly un-equal [sic] bargaining
power."); but cf. Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, 479 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) ("'[E]quitable' arguments for a total or partial abrogation of the [employment at
will] rule have been rejected, including the alleged unequal bargaining power between an employer
and employee ....").
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tionsy" it has gradually fallen into disfavor as the courts have increas-
ingly recognized exceptions to its operation.
12
The most widely accepted judicial limitation upon the employ-
ment at will rule is the public policy exception. 3 This exception
protects employees from being discharged because they performed an
act that public policy encourages or refused to perform an act that
public policy condemns.14 Most wrongful discharge claims"5 pre-
mised upon the public policy exception are based upon statutory
expressions of public policy. 6 Although the wrongful discharge claim
is a common law cause of action arising under state law,17 if the
employee asserts that his discharge violates the public policy expressed
11. See, e.g., Carter Coal Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 633 N.E.2d 202, 209 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 1275 (Ill. 1994); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466,
468-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993); Merritt v. Edson Express, 437
N.W.2d 528, 529 (S.D. 1989). See generally 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Indiv. Empl. Rts. Man.
505:1-2 (1991); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment
of the Rise of Employment-At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 689 (1994) ("Despite ... dramatic
changes in the scope of the at-will rule, the rule remains, weakened but alive, in every United
States jurisdiction today.").
12. See Boudar v. EG & G, 742 P.2d 491, 494 (N.M. 1987).
13. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 253; Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025,
1031-36 (Ariz. 1985).
14. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 256. "The most obvious example of this type of discharge is the
firing of an employee because the employee refuses to engage in some illegal conduct on behalf
of the employer." Richard Wall, At Will Employment in Washington: A Review of Thompson
v. St. Regis Paper Co. and Its Progeny, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 71, 80 (1990).
15. Although the term "wrongful discharge" (or "wrongful termination") occasionally is
given a broader interpretation, see, e.g., Ronald Weisenberger, Note, Remedies for Employer's
Wrongful Discharge of an Employee from Employment of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REV.
547, 566 n.116 (1988) ("'Wrongful discharge' refers to any discharge for which the employer is
or may be liable."), in the present context the term refers to a state common law cause of action,
usually sounding in tort, premised upon the public policy exception to the employment at will
rule. See, e.g., Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 808 P.2d 297, 303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
16. See Northrup v. Farmland Indus., 372 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1985). Employers
occasionally argue that "modifications of the at will doctrine are a policy question within the
special province of the legislature." Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841
(Wis. 1983). Some courts have been receptive to that argument, while others have flatly rejected
it. Compare Mann v. J.E. Baker Co., 733 F. Supp. 885, 889 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court looks with disfavor on any judicial attempt to limit the employment at will
doctrine.") with Percell v. IBM, 765 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ("Because the
employment at-will doctrine is a judicially adopted rule, it is the province of the courts to
delineate the scope of that rule."), affd, 23 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 1994).
17. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., 80 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996); Field v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Hedges v. Legal Servs. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 300,
304 (N.D. Cal. 1987); but cf. D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1478-79, 1484 &
n.13 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting, without deciding, that a wrongful discharge daim premised upon
the public policy expressed in a federal statute "implicates federal common law ... rather than
state common law, because rights arising out of a federal statute are at issue.").
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in a federal statute,18 the employer may be entitled to remove the case
to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. This
possibility is significant because plaintiffs typically bring wrongful
discharge cases in state court,' 9 while employers often prefer to have
them litigated in federal court where the substantive law is generally
more favorable to their position.2
This Article focuses on whether the alleged violation of federal
law as an element of a state law claim gives rise to a federal question
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, thereby creating federal
question jurisdiction.2' The resolution of that issue has been de-
scribed as the single most difficult problem in determining whether
federal question jurisdiction exists.22
This Article analyzes the federal question jurisdiction issue in the
context of state law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy articulated in federal law. 3 Part II of this Article contains a
general discussion of the public policy exception to the employment at
will rule. Part III discusses removal and federal question jurisdic-
tion.24 Part IV analyzes cases relevant to the issue of federal question
removal jurisdiction in the wrongful discharge context, including the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
18. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1992).
19. See David M. Lester, A Preemptive Strike: Removing Wrongjul Discharge Claims to
Federal Court Based Upon Damage Allegations, 5 LAB. LAW. 641, 641 (1989); see generally Enders
v. American Patent Search Co., 535 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 1976) (referring to the "more
familiar, relatively more convenient and therefore less expensive state courts."). Obviously, the
availability of state law wrongful discharge claims premised upon public policies reflected in
federal statutes also raises the question of whether a discharged employee can bring such a claim
in federal court in the first instance. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir.
1988). However, the issue is more likely to arise in the removal context because, as the "master
of his own pleadings," a plaintiff preferring a federal forum often can assert an express federal
claim and join the state law wrongful discharge claim under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
See Lyster v. First Nationwide Bank Fin. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1993); but
see Bally v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Mass. 1988) ("A plaintiff cannot manufacture federal
jurisdiction by artfully pleading his case so as to make federal law appear prominent.").
20. Kramer, supra note 1, at 261 ("Whenever possible, [wrongful discharge] defendants will
remove to a federal forum, because the substantive law there is friendlier to employers.").
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
22. Korb v. Raytheon Co., 707 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D. Mass. 1989). See also Willy, 855 F.2d
at 1165; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question
Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L. J. 17, 17 (1984).
23. For a broader discussion of the jurisdictional problem, see generally Hirshman, supra note
22.
24. For further analysis of these issues, see Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal
Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 812 (1987).
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ticals v. Thompson25 and Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp. 26 This Article concludes that a wrongful discharge claim based
solely upon public policy expressed in a federal statute for which there
is a private federal statutory remedy should be removable, particularly
where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the direct
statutory cause of action. However, the removal of wrongful discharge
claims based on other federal sources of public policy, such as federal
statutes for which there is no private statutory remedy, is precluded by
Merrell Dow and Christianson.27
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The public policy exception has been described as a judicially-
recognized "outer limit" to the employment at will rule and is designed
to vindicate the rights of employees discharged for reasons that violate
public policy.28 Although virtually all states recognize the exception
in some form,2 9 they disagree on the extent to which it limits an
employer's right to discharge its employees.3 °
The public policy exception began as a narrow rule permitting
employees to sue their employers when they were discharged in
violation of express statutory prohibitions.31 It was expanded to
prohibit discharges which violated more general constitutional or
statutory expressions of public policy. 32  More recently, many courts
25. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
26. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
27. Although there is also a valid argument for permitting the removal of wrongful discharge
claims premised solely on federal laws for which there is no private federal remedy, that result
appears to be precluded by Merrell Dow. See infra note 311.
28. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 171 (N.C. 1992).
29. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) ("(T]he vast majority of states
have recognized that an at-will employee possesses a tort action when he or she is discharged for
performing an act that public policy would encourage, or for refusing to do something that public
policy would condemn.").
30. See Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986).
31. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1031. "Such [an] express prohibition ... generally is found
only in labor statutes." 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5.14, at 452 n.144 (3d ed. 1992).
32. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1031. See generally Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union,
384 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Wis. 1986):
The legislature has not and cannot cover every type of wrongful termination that
violates a clear mandate of public policy. There are public policies embodied in statutes
and the constitution that do not specifically address wrongful discharge but are
nevertheless meant to be inherently incorporated into every employment-at-will
relationship.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
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have recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge even in the
absence of constitutional or statutory expressions of public policy. 33
For example, several states now recognize wrongful discharge
claims based on public policies expressed in decisional law.14 In some
jurisdictions, a professional code of ethics or unwritten "customs and
conventions of the people"35 have been found to be sufficient expres-
sions of public policy to support wrongful discharge claims.36
Additionally, in order to encourage employees to expose their
employers' illegal or unsafe practices,37 many states also protect
"whistleblowers" from discharge38  without requiring a directly
applicable constitutional, statutory or decisional expression of public
policy. Even a public policy expressed in the law of another state may
support a wrongful discharge claim under some circumstances,3 9
33. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1031. $ee generally Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 620
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("There may [be] some instances [in which] the judiciary would have to
imply a right as well as a remedy."), rev'd on other grounds, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984), overruled
on other grounds Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).
34. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1034, 1036; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685
P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984).
35. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)); see also Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) ("In general, it can be said that
public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively.").
36. See Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Medical Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996);
Radwan v. Beecham Lab., 850 F.2d 147, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1988).
37. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 257 (quoting Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1035). However,
whistleblowing activity may be at least theoretically at odds with "accepted concepts of employee
loyalty." Id.; cf. E. Ames, Recent Development, Willy v. Coastal Corp.: The Fifth Circuit Blows
the Whistle on Removal Jurisdiction, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1230, 1239 (1989) (observing that "r[m]any
persons undoubtedly find whistleblowing less than honorable."). For an extended discussion of
the differing interests at stake, see Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d
723, 725-34 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring).
38. Whether the public policy exception protects employees from retaliatory conduct short
of discharge is an open question in most jurisdictions. Compare Ludwig v. C & A Wallcoverings,
750 F. Supp. 339, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("[T]his court declines ... to extend state law by creating
a cause of action for retaliatory demotion."), affd, 960 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1992) with Garcia v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 232 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[A]n employee can maintain
a tort claim against his or her employer where disciplinary action has been taken against the
employee in retaliation for the employee's 'whistle-blowing' activities, even though the ultimate
sanction of discharge has not been imposed.").
39. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Utah 1992). The Peterson court
reasoned that "[t]he effect on the employee.., is the same regardless of the origin of the law."
Id. at 1283; but cf. Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 596 F. Supp. 384, 386 (N.D. I11. 1984)
(finding it "difficult to discern why Illinois public policy would be implicated by the discharge
of an employee of an Oregon corporation for [safety] complaints which [he made] in Oregon").
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although discerning the public policy of another state may occasionally
be difficult for courts.
40
Despite these expansive interpretations of the public policy
exception, a few courts still confine the exception to public policies
expressed in state law.4 However, the better view is that at least
some federal expressions of public policy will also support such a
claim.42  To the extent that most courts continue to recognize
wrongful discharge claims based on federal public policies, the right of
employers sued in state court to remove such claims will be debated.43
III. REMOVAL AND FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
Generally, Congress grants state court defendants the right to
remove to federal court provided that the case could have been brought
in federal court initially.44 Thus, determining whether employers can
remove common law wrongful discharge claims premised upon federal
public policies depends upon whether such claims fall within the
federal courts' original federal question jurisdiction.45
40. Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283 n.3. The difficulty may be significant. Compare McCarthy
v. Cycare Sys., 2 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 680, 682-84 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (federal court in
Illinois predicting that Iowa courts would conclude that the "contravention of a public policy set
forth in federal law does not support a state law claim for wrongful discharge") with Smuck v.
National Management Corp., 540 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
"violation of federal law may serve as a basis for a well-recognized public policy exception for
purposes of wrongful termination claims" in Iowa).
41. One court recently observed that "public policy which warrants an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine must be of uniform, statewide application; it cannot be fragmentary,
as with a single municipal ordinance." Greenwood v. Taft, Stellinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d
1030, 1033 (Ohio 1995). See, e.g., Burrow v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 363 S.E.2d 215, 220
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ill. Ct. App.
1986), leave to appeal denied, 506 N.E.2d 959 (Ill. 1987). See generally Victoria W. Shelton, Note,
Will the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine Ever Be Clear?-Amos v.
Oakdale Knitting Co., 14 CAMPBELL L. REV. 123, 131 (1991).
42. See, e.g., D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, 628 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1993) ("[T]his
Court and other courts .. .have found a wrongful-discharge cause of action when based on a
dearly-articulated federal policy."); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 188 (Md.
1989).
43. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
44. Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 842 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (D. Wyo. 1994); Zack Co.
v. Howard, 658 F. Supp. 73, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Stokes v. Bechtel N. Am. Power Corp., 614 F.
Supp. 732, 735 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
45. Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 75; see also Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Cal.
1986):
The question ... is whether [the] incorporation of federal policy into a state law cause
of action is sufficient to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction. The issue is, in
essence, whether [a state law] wrongful discharge claim [incorporating federal public
policy] comes within the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal
district court jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
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With certain narrow exceptions,46 an employer against whom a
federal claim has been asserted in state court has the right to remove
the claim to federal court.47 When the right is exercised, removal
ordinarily is not limited to the federal claim, but also includes any
pendent state law claims4" asserted against the employer,49 as well as
any state law claims asserted against "pendent party" defendants.50
The statutory authorization of federal question jurisdiction appears
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331,51 which states that "[t]he district courts shall
the United States."
46. Some federal claims initially asserted in state court cannot be removed to federal court.
For example, Congress has provided that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. III 1991), the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1988), and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988), are not subject to removal. See
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a); Emrich v. Touche Ross Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1988); Simmons v. California, Dep't of Indus. Relations, 740 F. Supp. 781, 786-87 (E.D.
Cal. 1990). There is also support for the view that claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), are not removable, although the weight of authority is to the
contrary. See Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 450-51 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
824 (1986).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
48. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits federal courts to hear state law claims
together with federal claims if (1) the federal claims at issue are not frivolous, (2) the state and
federal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," and (3) the claims are such that
a plaintiff ordinarily would be expected to try them all in one proceeding. Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966)).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. III 1991); Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Universal
Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885, 889-92 (C.D. Cal. 1987). One possible exception appears in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445(c), which states: "A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's
compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1988). The courts are split on whether this provision precludes the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over state law workers' compensation claims. Compare Spearman v. Exxon
Coal USA, 16 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Even a case containing a federal claim may not be
removed if it also arises under a state workers' compensation law.") with Cedillo v. Valcar
Enterprises & Darling Delaware Co., Inc. 773 F. Supp. 932, 941 (Tex. 1991) ("Nothing about
§ 1445(c) justifies erecting it as a per se bar to exercising pendent jurisdiction.").
50. In employment cases, the pendent party defendant is often the plaintiffs supervisor.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396, 400 n.2 (N.D. IN1. 1988). One federal court
has observed that the recently enacted Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, "now
allows for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction, the absence of which previously presented
a large obstacle in cases . . . where federal and state claims are asserted against one defendant,
[and] only state claims are alleged against other defendants." Alexander by Alexander v.
Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (M.D. Ala. 1991). For the author's view that
pendent party removal jurisdiction may be unavailable in the Ninth Circuit, see Michael D.
Moberly et al, Penetrating the Thicket: Pendent Party Removal Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit,
30 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1993-94).
51. Prior to the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875, Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat.
470, the federal courts had no general federal question jurisdiction. See McGaw v. Farrow, 472
F.2d 952, 955 (4th Cir. 1973). However, federal question jurisdiction has been continuously
available in essentially the same form since that time. See Matter of Seven Springs Apartments,
Wrongful Discharge
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." 2 Although the Supreme
Court has consistently declined to provide a single, precise definition
of the "arising under" requirement in § 1331,"3 two tests have
emerged which determine whether a cause of action arises under federal
law. The vast majority of cases that come under this grant of
jurisdiction fall within Justice Holmes's test in American Well Works
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.," which provides that a suit arises under
the law that "creates" the cause of action."5 Federal law therefore"creates" the cause of action where it establishes and defines the rights
and obligations of the parties.56
Because not all cases properly in federal court are "created" by
federal law within the meaning of American Well Works,57 federal
question jurisdiction also may be exercised over a claim that is created
by state law where resolution of a substantial federal issue is necessary
to the disposition of the claim." Thus, even if federal law does not
create a plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim, federal jurisdiction
nevertheless may exist if "some substantial, disputed question of federal
law is a necessary element" of the claim.59 It is on this basis that
federal question jurisdiction is properly asserted over wrongful
discharge claims in violation of a public policy expressed in federal law.
Phase II, 33 B.R. 458, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
53. See Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1409; see also Almanza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F.
Supp. 1474, 1477 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
54. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
55. Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for So.
California, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (quoting American Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260); see also
Heckelmann v. Piping Cos., 904 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Okla. 1995); Drake, 842 F. Supp.
at 1410; Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1166.
56. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A., Ltd. v. Morts, 878 F.2d 1096 (1989).
57. See, e.g., Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1411.
58. See Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("[I]t is ... clear that there
may be federal subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action created by state law, if 'some
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state
claims."') (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13). See generally Willy, 855 F.2d at 1168.
59. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1166 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13). Central to the
inquiry is a requirement that the state law claim "depend" upon an issue of federal law. Bally
v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D. Mass. 1988). The requirement "serves the purpose of
preventing a federal district court from finding jurisdiction on the basis of a federal issue that
ultimately proves irrelevant to the dispute." Id.
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IV. FEDERAL QUESTION REMOVAL JURISDICTION IN
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CASES
A. The Requirement That There Be a Private Statutory
Right of Action
The existence of federal question jurisdiction, in wrongful
discharge cases depends in large measure upon whether the federal
statute expressing the public policy upon which the wrongful discharge
claim is based establishes a direct private statutory right of action.
The importance of that issue stems from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson.60
Although not itself a wrongful discharge case, Merrell Dow is relevant
to this issue because the Merrell Dow Court held that where no direct
private right of action exists to remedy a federal statutory violation,
there is no federal question jurisdiction over cases relying on the
statutory violation as an element of a state law claim. This section
discusses the evolution of the Merrell Dow view, including cases
decided both before and after Merrell Dow, with particular focus on the
impact of Merrell Dow on state law wrongful discharge claims.
1. The Pre-Merrell Dow View
The first case dealing with the removal of a state law wrongful
discharge claim based on federal public policy did not require the
existence of a private, federal statutory cause of action. The plaintiff
in Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.6 alleged that he had
been wrongfully discharged for making safety complaints in violation
of the "public policy enumerated in the statutes of the United States
of America and the State of Arizona, including but not limited to the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. '62 The Ninth Circuit held that
60. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
61. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 1475. The Olguin plaintiff apparently anticipated the decision in Wagner v. City
of Globe, 722 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986), where the Arizona Supreme Court held that an employee
discharged for "expos[ing] activities which ... may jeopardize health and safety" can state a claim
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Arizona law. Id. at 257. Although the
Arizona Supreme Court did not recognize a wrongful discharge claim premised upon the public
policy exception to the employment at will rule until the year after Olguin was decided, see
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), the Arizona Court of
Appeals had indicated that Arizona might recognize the exception in Larsen v. Motor Supply Co.,
573 P.2d 907, 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), and the Ninth Circuit had cited Larsen in a pre-Olguin
case for the proposition that Arizona "does recognize a limitation on employment discharges that
would violate a public policy." Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1979).
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because the plaintiff had invoked federal law in support of his wrongful
discharge claim, the case was removable on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction.63 In reaching its conclusion, the court opined
that a state has little interest in enforcing federal law, even if the
federal law is incorporated in the state's general public policy.64
Shortly after Olguin was decided, the Seventh Circuit reached a
different result in Buethe v. Britt Airlines.6" In Buethe, a pilot brought
suit against his former employer for wrongful discharge alleging that
he had been terminated for fulfilling a duty under the Federal Aviation
Act66 to refrain from flying a defective aircraft.67 The Seventh
Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction,6" despite the
fact that the plaintiff may have been required to prove that he had a
duty under federal law to refrain from flying aircraft with inoperative
61equipment, thereby requiring the court to resolve issues of federal
law.7" Because the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim was, in the
court's opinion, only indirectly based on a federal statute,71 the claim
63. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1475.
64. Id. This portion of Olguin has been interpreted as holding that "contravention of a
public policy set forth in federal law does not support a state law claim for wrongful discharge."
McCarthy, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 683 (citing Olguin). However, the Olguin court
merely held that the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim was removable, not that it was untenable.
Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1475. The Olguin court's determination that wrongful discharge claims
premised upon federal public policies arise under federal law for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction remains instructive, particularly in the Ninth Circuit. See id. ("Olguin explicitly
invoked federal law in this cause of action and it was therefore removable, if not under section
301, then under the general federal question statute ...."). As discussed infra, however, the
Olguin analysis has been limited by the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) and Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). See, e.g., Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 991-92 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (interpreting and applying Olguin in a case decided after Merrell Dow and Christianson).
65. 749 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1984).
66. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988), recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-41901 (1994).
67. Buethe, 749 F.2d at 1237-38.
68. Other courts have gone further, holding that the public policy embodied in the Federal
Aviation Act will not support a state law wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g., Tritle v. Crown
Airways, 751 F. Supp. 585, 585-86 (S.D. W.Va. 1989); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 596
F. Supp. 384, 385-86 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit itself suggested as much in
a subsequent opinion in the Buethe case. Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 787 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (7th
Cir. 1986).
69. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 454 F.2d 1052, 1054 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (observing
that a pilot "could not authorize a flight lacking any ... required equipment"); cf. Arney v.
United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that "it is the pilot's duty to see that
the plane is ... maintained"); Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391, 396 (E.D. Tenn. 1965)
("It is the pilot's duty to see that the airplane is properly repaired.").
70. See Buethe, 749 F.2d at 1239.
71. Id. The Buethe court observed that "[t]he most one can say is that a question of federal
law is lurking in the background." Id. at 1239 (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,
117 (1936)); cf. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171 (concluding that "the role of ... federal law [in a
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did not arise under federal law.72 Thus, the court held that there was
no federal jurisdiction over the claim.73
2. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, the United States
Supreme Court considered the issue of removal jurisdiction over a state
law claim incorporating a federal element.74 In Merrell Dow, the
Court emphasized the importance of the availability of a private federal
statutory right of action in considering the removal issue.
The defendant in Merrell Dow was the manufacturer and
distributor of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug often taken by
pregnant women to prevent morning sickness. Litigation was
commenced in numerous jurisdictions by women claiming that their
use of the drug had caused birth defects in their children.75 In the
case that resulted in the Supreme Court's decision,76 the plaintiffs
filed suit in state court alleging common law claims for negligence,
breach of warranty, strict liability, and fraud.77 As part of their
negligence claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the drug had been
misbranded in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)7" because the labeling did not provide adequate warning of
the drug's potential dangers.79
wrongful discharge claim] is more collateral than in the forefront"); Juliano v. Phoenix
Communications, No. C-94-20401 SW, 1994 WL 721576, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1994)
(concluding that "state law issues clearly predominate" in wrongful discharge cases).
72. Buethe, 749 F.2d at 1239; see generally Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal.
1986) ("The leading definition of 'arising under' [jurisdiction] ... stat[es] simply that to confer
federal jurisdiction, there must be a substantial claim founded 'directly' upon federal law.") (citing
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM L. REV. 157, 165
(1953)).
73. Buethe, 749 F.2d at 1239. As discussed below, the fact that there was no direct statutory
cause of action available to remedy the conduct at issue in Buethe, see Tlitle, 751 F. Supp. at 585,
may have been an important (although unstated) consideration underlying the court's decision
(which apparently was reached without the benefit of briefing or argument by the parties). See
Buethe, 749 F.2d at 1238 n.3 and 1239.
74. 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986).
75. Id. at 805.
76. See generally In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1988) (referring to
"eleven hundred eighty daims in approximately eight hundred forty-four multidistrict cases,"
which represented "only a part of the Bendectin cases.., brought in numerous federal and state
courts around the nation"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
77. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
78. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1990).
79. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06. Among other things, the FDCA requires that drug
labels bear "adequate warnings against use in those pathological conditions or by children where
its use may be dangerous to health." 21 U.S.C. § 352(f).
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The defendant removed the case to federal court, arguing that the
action was founded in part on a federal claim under the FDCA. °
Although the district court agreed that federal question jurisdiction
existed, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' cause of
action did not arise under federal law."' After concluding that the
FDCA did not create a private right of action,82 the Sixth Circuit held
that federal question jurisdiction would exist only if the plaintiffs' right
to relief necessarily depended upon a substantial question of federal
law.83 Accordingly, because the plaintiffs' reference to the FDCA
was only one basis of their negligence claim, and a jury could find that
the defendant had been negligent without finding that the FDCA had
been violated, the plaintiffs' cause of action did not arise under federal
law. 84
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.8" The
Court held that the plaintiffs' allegation that a presumption of
negligence could be drawn from the defendant's violation of the FDCA
did not bring their negligence claim within the district court's federal
question jurisdiction. 6 The Court concluded that where Congress
has not established a private, federal cause of action for the violation
of a federal statute,8 7 a complaint alleging a violation of the statute as
an element of a state law claim does not state a claim arising under
federal law.88 The Court explained:
[T]he congressional determination that there should be no federal
remedy for the violation of [a] federal statute is tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of
80. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806.
81. Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 766 F.2d 1005, 1005-06 (6th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
82. Id. at 1006. See generally Mellon v. Barre-National Drug Co., 636 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) ("Under the federal decisions that have addressed this issue, it has uniformly
been held that there are no private causes of action under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
. .. .").
83. Thompson, 766 F.2d at 1006.
84. Id.
85. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
86. Id. at 812.
87. The Court's assumption that no private cause of action exists under the FDCA
apparently was based upon a concession by the parties, see Thompson, 766 F.2d at 1006, and in
the view of one commentator creates "the greatest difficulty in accepting the result reached by the
majority." William V. Luneburg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation-A Comment on Federal Question
Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 757, 764
(1987).
88. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817.
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the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently
"substantial" to confer federal-question jurisdiction. 9
3. The Post-Merrell Dow View
Following Merrell Dow, a defendant's assertion that a federal
statute is an essential element of a state law claim no longer appears to
be sufficient in itself to establish federal question jurisdiction.90 Such
jurisdiction can exist only if the federal statute asserted as an essential
element of the claim creates a private right of action. 91 Thus, Merrell
Dow effectively limited the Olguin court's holding on the removability
of wrongful discharge claims to cases involving federal statutes that
provide for private remedies of their own.92
A number of wrongful discharge cases following Merrell Dow
confirm this conclusion. In Utley v. Varian Associates," for example,
the Ninth Circuit held that if a federal law does not provide a private
right of action, a state law claim based on its violation94 does not raise
a sufficiently substantial federal question to support federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 9" Because the only federal
remedy available in Utley was administrative, the court found
insufficient evidence that Congress intended to permit suit against the
89. Id. at 814.
90. See Almanza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1474, 1478 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
91. Id.
92. See Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1394 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988):
In Merrell Dow... the Court considered in detail the principles of removal jurisdiction
when applied to a well-pleaded complaint that relies on a state cause of action which
incorporates federal law as one of the elements of recovery. The Court held that in such
a case, the state claim does not involve a substantial federal question unless the federal
law incorporated in the state cause of action provides a federal private right of action for
its violation.
93. 811 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987).
94. Utley was a state law employment discrimination action premised in part upon the
employer's alleged violation of its federal obligations under Executive Order 11246. Id. at 1281-
82. That executive order prohibits government contractors from discriminating against employees
and applicants because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and requires that they take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants and employees are treated without regard to their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d
1319, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
95. Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.
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employer in federal court.96 The Utley court therefore declined to
support federal question jurisdiction over the state law claim. 97
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California reached a similar conclusion in Hedges v. Legal Services
Corp.9" The plaintiff in Hedges brought suit against his former
employer, the Legal Services Corporation, for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.99 Because the plaintiff claimed that his
discharge was politically motivated, the court presumed he was relying
on the Legal Services Corporation Act,"'0 a federal statute prohibiting
the discharge of an employee based on the employee's political
affiliation." 1
The court indicated that it might have had jurisdiction if Congress
had created a private right of action for violations of the Legal Services
Corporation Act. °2 Because Congress had not done so,' °3 howev-
er, the court remanded the case to state court. Again, the Merrell Dow
decision was interpreted as holding that where no private right of
action exists for a federal statutory violation, federal courts have no
jurisdiction over cases relying upon a violation of the federal statute as
an element of a state law claim'0 4
In Johnson v. Smith,1°5 the request for removal was based on an
allegation that the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged in violation of
96. Id. Although the Utley court spoke in terms of congressional intent, Executive Order
11246 actually is a product of the executive branch. See Savannah Printing Specialties & Paper
Prods. Local Union 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See
generally Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[C]ourts have repeatedly held that executive order 11246 does not create a private cause of
action for employees to enforce the equal opportunity clause in their employers' government
contracts.").
97. Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.
98. 663 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
99. Id. at 300-01. The Legal Services Corporation is a private nonprofit corporation
established by Congress to provide financial support to persons unable to afford legal assistance
in civil matters. Id. at 300.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1988).
101. Hedges, 663 F. Supp. at 302. The pertinent portion of the Legal Services Corporation
Act provides that "[n]o political test or political qualification shall be used in selecting, appointing,
promoting, or taking any other personnel action with respect to any officer, agent, or employee
of the [Legal Services] Corporation." 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(b)(2).
102. Hedges, 663 F. Supp. at 302.
103. See Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, 615 F. Supp. 916, 937 (N.D. Tex.
1985). For an extensive discussion of the unavailability of a private right of action under the
Legal Services Corporation Act, see Grassley v. Legal Servs. Corp., 535 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Iowa
1982).
104. Hedges, 663 F. Supp. at 304.
105. 630 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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the public policy prohibiting disability discrimination °6 embodied in
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.17 In holding that the
plaintiffs claim did not provide a basis for federal question jurisdic-
tion, 08 the Johnson court rejected the employer's contention that the
federal policy prohibiting disability discrimination supplies the
requisite federal question.' °9 The court instead relied upon the fact
that the pertinent provision of the Rehabilitation Act has not been
construed to create a private right of action for redress of discriminato-
ry conduct."0 This statutory scheme, the court concluded, precluded
a finding that incorporation of the federal policy against disability
discrimination into a state law wrongful discharge claim provides a
sufficient basis for removal:
In creating the lower federal courts and vesting in them jurisdiction
over all cases "arising under" federal law, Congress presumably
intended to provide for the uniform interpretation and application
of federal law. That interest would simply not be served by
including within federal jurisdiction cases in which Congress
specifically did not intend to create a private cause of action. Under
such circumstances, the incorporation of a federal policy within a
state law cause of action is insufficient to give rise to a sufficiently
"substantial" or "direct" federal issue. This sort of case, although
tangentially involving a "federal" element, should not fall within
federal district court jurisdiction."'
106. Id. at 2.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988). Among other things, the Rehabilitation Act requires certain
government contractors to take affirmative action in the employment of qualified individuals with
disabilities. Id.
108. Several courts have gone further, holding that the public policy embodied in the
Rehabilitation Act will not support a state law wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g., Kramer v. St.
Louis Regional Health Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317, 1318-19 (E.D. Mo. 1991); D'Amato v.
Wisconsin Gas Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 567, 569 (E.D. Wis. 1983), affd, 760 F.2d
1474, 1484 & n.13 (7th Cir. 1985).
109. Johnson, 630 F. Supp. at 3-4.
110. Id. at 3. The Johnson court observed that "Congress has expressly declined to create
jurisdiction in any court for claims of§ 503 violations, opting instead for an entirely administrative
process." Id. at 3. The analysis might have been different had the claim in Johnson been based
upon the public policy expressed in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), since
that provision generally has been construed to create an implied private federal cause of action.
See Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 63 F.3d 1404, 1413 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Section 504
does not expressly create a private remedy for individuals with disabilities who have been
subjected to discrimination. However, this court and other circuits have implied a private right
of action under section 504.").
111. Johnson, 630 F. Supp. at 4.
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Subsequently, in Gaballah v. PG & E,n 2 the court relied upon
Utley v. Varian Associates"3 to hold that a wrongful discharge claim
premised upon the public policy set forth in the Energy Reorganization
Act of 19744 was not removable because the only remedy available
to the plaintiff under the act was administrative." 5  The Gaballah
court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim
did not involve a federal question." 6
However, the Gaballah court observed that the critical factor in
Merrell Dow and Utley was that Congress had not created a private
federal remedy for violation of the statutes at issue in those cases."'
The observation of the Gaballah court suggests that where Congress
has created a private right of action, the presence of a claimed violation
of the federal statute as an element of a state law claim should be
sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction."' Although such
an inference is logical, the next section discusses why it has not been
consistently applied.
B. The Availability of a Private Federal Statutory Right of Action
May Not Be Sufficient to Support Removal
As the preceding section demonstrates, Merrell Dow and its
progeny established a per se rule that federal question jurisdiction is not
established where Congress has not created a private right of action
112. 711 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
113. 811 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988). The principal goals of the Energy Reorganization Act
are to develop reliable energy sources; to restore, protect and enhance environmental quality; and
to assure public health and safety. Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989).
115. Gaballah, 711 F. Supp. at 992; see also Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873
F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1101 (1986).
116. Gaballah, 711 F. Supp. at 992. This analysis is unpersuasive. Although enforcement
of the Energy Reorganization Act begins with the filing of an administrative complaint with the
United States Secretary of Labor, who is authorized to award relief in the event that a violation
of the act has occurred, "enforcement of the Secretary's order may be initiated by the employee
by filing suit in Federal district court." Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 378
(IMI. 1985) (Moran, J., dissenting) (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122
(1986).
117. Gaballah, 711 F. Supp. at 992; but see Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble With
Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1561 (1991)
(arguing that "the presence or absence of a cause of action or remedy within the federal statute
(should be] but one-not necessarily the dispositive-factor for the court to assess").
118. See Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1168; see also Almanza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802
F. Supp. 1474, 1478 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
Seattle University Law Review
within a federal statute." 9 Such a limitation on federal jurisdiction
over state law wrongful discharge claims is appropriate. A contrary
result would effectively permit states to create federal question
jurisdiction where Congress has declined to do so merely by permitting
the incorporation of a federal public policy (for the violation of which
there is no direct federal remedy) into a state law wrongful discharge
claim.
120
However, the preceding line of cases did not address the converse
situation-where Congress has created a private federal right of
action.'12  The dissent in Merrell Dow concluded that the majority's
holding necessarily means that where there is a private cause of action
under the federal statute, federal jurisdiction over a state law claim
incorporating the statute would exist. 22  Others have also alluded to
that possibility.2 3 Although that interpretation is appealing, it has
not been widely accepted.
24  -
Most courts instead have engaged in a pragmatic, case-by-case
analysis in situations where a private federal remedy exists, focusing on
whether Congress intended the provision of such a remedy to give
federal courts jurisdiction over state law claims which incorporate the
pertinent federal statute. 12  In several instances this approach has
resulted in the conclusion that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
over state law wrongful discharge claims where the federal remedy
provided for in the statute is administrative rather than judicial.'26
Even where there is a private federal judicial remedy, some courts have
found that federal jurisdiction may not exist if the remedy is limited
to injunctive relief, and includes no private damages component. 127
Two decisions have gone. so far as to suggest that the presence of a
federal statute establishing a private federal judicial remedy simply will
119. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1169.
120. Johnson, 630 F. Supp. at 3; see also Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169; Clark v. Velsicol, 944 F.2d
196, 199 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 (1992).
121. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., 80 F.3d 339, 347 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996); Lyster, 829 F. Supp.
at 1169.
122. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., Gray v. Murphy Oil USA, 874 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
124. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir.
1994); Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169; Gray, 874 F. Supp. at 754; see generally Ames, supra note 37, at
1234 (observing that "a private federal remedy may not be enough to invoke jurisdiction if the
relevant federal law is but one theory on which the state claim rests").
125. See Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 152.
126. See Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283; Gaballah, 711 F. Supp. at 992; Johnson, 630 F. Supp. at
3.
127. See, e.g., Wagner v. Regent Invs., 903 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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not support federal jurisdiction over state law wrongful discharge
claims premised upon the statute. 2 '
For instance, in Zack Co. v. Howard,29 plaintiffs filed suit in
state court alleging that they had been wrongfully discharged in
retaliation for reporting safety violations at a nuclear power plant where
their employer was a subcontractor. 30 The employer removed the
action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction,
asserting that a federal law, the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974,131 which provides for a private judicial remedy,'32 was an
"indispensible element" of the plaintiffs' claim.
133
After removal, the district court remanded the action for lack of
federal question jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim arose
under Illinois law, rather than under federal law, despite the Energy
Reorganization Act being the source of public policy upon which the
wrongful discharge claim was founded. 134  The district court based
its holding upon the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Wheeler v.
128. See, e.g., Zack Co. v. Howard, 658 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. IUI. 1987); Willy, 855 F.2d 1160
(5th Cir. 1988); Ames, supra note 37, at 1237 ("[T]he [Willy] court [was] just a step from finding
that wrongful discharge claims are so firmly planted in the general principles of [state]
employment law that their vigor and breadth plainly relegate any incorporated federal element to
collateral status.") (internal quotation marks and authority omitted).
129. 658 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. IM. 1987).
130. Id. at 75.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988). Section 210 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, "affords
protection to employees who believe that they have been discharged or discriminated against
because they have testified, given evidence, or reported violations of Federal nuclear safety
standards." Vheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 378 (111. 1985) (Moran, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(e); Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990).
However, the private right of action under the Energy Reorganization Act is somewhat unique,
in that the relief available is limited to judicial enforcement of orders issued by the Secretary of
Labor, whose authority encompasses the right to order reinstatement of a discharged employee,
and to award compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and other costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b) and
(c).
133. Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 75. The employer also argued that the plaintiffs' claim was
preempted by the Energy Reorganization Act. Id. Although the court did not reach that issue,
it noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had previously suggested that the Energy Reorganization
Act "was not intended to preempt actions for wrongful discharge under state law." Id. at 76, 78
& n.2 (discussing Wheeler, 485 N.E.2d at 372); cf. Field, 565 A.2d at 1177 (observing that there
is "no basis for concluding that the (Energy Reorganization Act] preempts a state law wrongful
discharge claim premised upon [Energy Reorganization Act] violations").
134. Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 77; see Field, 565 A.2d at 1181 ("There is nothing
inconsistent with the [Energy Reorganization Act] in [a] decision to allow a state law wrongful
discharge action premised upon violations of the [Energy Reorganization Act]."); but cf. Masters
v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990) (Energy Reorganization Act does not
support a wrongful discharge claim under Kansas law because the remedies under the federal act
are adequate).
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Caterpillar Tractor Co.' Wheeler held that a cause of action for the
wrongful discharge of a nuclear worker was based entirely upon state
law, "despite the availability of a federal remedy under the Energy
Reorganization Act."' 36 Because the complaint in Zack Co. could be
pleaded without relying on federal law, the district court held that the
case had been removed improperly.'37
Willy v. Coastal Corp.'38 is another case suggesting that the
existence of a private federal judicial remedy is not in itself sufficient
to support federal jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff claimed to
have been discharged for insisting that his employer comply with
various federal environmental statutes.' He brought suit in state
court, alleging wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot Service v.
Hauck,4 ' which "established a Texas common law wrongful dis-
charge action for at-will employees who have been fired for refusing to
perform an illegal act . . .,.""' The employer removed the case to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.'42 The
employer argued that federal jurisdiction existed because the federal
statutes the plaintiff had allegedly refused to violate were a necessary
element of his claim, 14 3 and a private, federal remedy was available
under those statutes.'"
The district court agreed, and denied the plaintiffs motion to
remand. 14  The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that the only remedies
135. 485 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
136. Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 77 (discussing Wheeler). Specifically, the Wheeler court held
that a plaintiff discharged for refusing to violate federal safety regulations "stated a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge for refusing to work under conditions which contravened . . . dearly
mandated public policy." Wheeler, 485 N.E.2d at 377.
137. Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 79; cf. Stokes v. Bechtel N. Am. Power Corp., 614 F. Supp.
732, 742 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
138. 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 1162. Among other contentions, the plaintiff alleged that he had refused to
violate the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1988), and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1988).
140. 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
141. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1163. This rule was subsequently extended to a situation in which
an employee is discharged "for simply inquiring into whether or not she is committing illegal
acts." Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib., 776 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). The Texas
Supreme Court has indicated that "public policy ... expressed in both state and federal law" can
support a wrongful discharge claim under Sabine Pilot Service. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
142. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1163.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1168.
145. Id. at 1163; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 119 & n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1986),
rev'd, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 20:81
1996] Wrongful Discharge
available under the pertinent federal statutes were administrative. 146
Thus, based on the remedies available, the Fifth Circuit found no
federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim.147
Significantly, the Willy court also concluded that even if a private
federal judicial remedy had been available, 141 the federal element in
the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim would not have been sufficient
to establish federal question jurisdiction. 149  Characterizing the
availability of a private federal remedy as the "minimum" requirement
for a finding of federal jurisdiction under Merrell Dow, 5' the court
stated:
While Merrell Dow held that a private, federal remedy was a
necessary predicate to determining that the presence of a federal
element in a state-created cause of action resulted in that cause of
action being one which arose under federal law, it did not hold that
the presence of any private, federal remedy would in all instances
suffice for that purpose.'
The court concluded that there would have been no federal
question jurisdiction over the plaintiff s wrongful discharge claim even
if a private federal remedy existed because the wrongful discharge
146. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169. The plaintiff had pursued those administrative remedies
before initiating the wrongful discharge litigation that resulted in the Fifth Circuit's opinion. Id.
at 1162-63; see also In re Willy, 831 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987).
147. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169. The court stated:
Just as it would "flout" congressional intent to allow a federal court to exercise federal
question jurisdiction over a removed claim for violation of a federal statute that does not
provide a federal cause of action, it would equally flout congressional intent to give the
federal court original (and hence removal) jurisdiction based on statutes that limit the
federal remedy to an administrative action.
Id. (citing Merrell Dow).
148. Although section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988), "does not
authorize a private right of action for the recovery of damages," City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1982), it "expressly authorizes private citizens to
seek injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of the Clean Water Act." Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, 588 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Mass. 1983). Whether that is sufficient
to support federal jurisdiction is unclear. See Wagner v. Regent Invs., 903 F. Supp. 966, 969-70
(E.D. Va. 1995) (concluding that federal jurisdiction does not exist where there is "no remedy for
damages under the relevant [federal statute]").
149. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1168; cf. Miller v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 834 F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir.
1987):
[A] finding of an express or implied private right of action is a necessary but not a
sufficient indication that the federal question is a substantial one. Rather, even when
there is such a cause of action, the use of a federal statute as an element of a state cause
of action may or may not raise a substantial federal question depending on the nature
of the federal interest at stake in the case.
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claim was predicated on both state and federal statutes.' 1 2 Because
there was nothing in the pleadings or state law to indicate that state
statutes alone were insufficient to support the claim,'53 the court held
that the Supreme Court's decision in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.,"5 4 which is discussed in the next section, prevented
a finding that the wrongful discharge claim arose under federal
law.1
55
C. The Significance of an Alternative State Law Public Policy
Supporting the Claim
As discussed in the preceding sections, there is no federal question
jurisdiction over a state law wrongful discharge claim premised upon
a federal public policy if the federal statute establishing the public
policy provides for no direct private statutory right of action. The
preceding cases also suggest that the mere existence of a private
statutory right of action, standing alone, may not be sufficient to
support federal question jurisdiction over a wrongful discharge claim.
This section expands that analysis by considering what impact the
presence of an alternative state law public policy supporting the
wrongful discharge claim has on the federal question jurisdiction issue.
1. Jurisdiction Where State and Federal Public Policies Provide
Alternative Support for the Claim
In Christianson, the Court considered the circumstances under
which a claim will be deemed to arise under a federal statute relating
to patents for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a).156  Although the plaintiff in Christianson prevailed in
district court on a patent law theory, the complaint alleged alternative
theories of recovery that did not involve patent law.'' The Court
152. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1169-71; see also Ames, supra note 37, at 1233-36.
153. In other words, the claim was supported by "alternate" theories:
[F]irst, that [the plaintiffs] discharge was wrongful because it was on account of his
attempt to cause employer compliance with or his refusal to violate federal law, and
second that it was wrongful because it was on account of his attempt to cause employer
compliance with or his refusal to violate state law.
Willy, 855 F.2d at 1170.
154. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
155. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1170-71.
156. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807. Section 1338(a) provides that "[tihe district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1988).
157. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810-13.
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found federal question jurisdiction to be lacking, holding that the
federal courts only have jurisdiction over a claim supported by
alternative theories if patent law is essential to each theory."' 8 In
reaching that conclusion, the Christianson Court noted that its analysis
of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) was governed by the
principles that apply in determining whether a claim raises a federal
question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.159
A number of courts have applied the reasoning of the Christianson
court to wrongful discharge claims. The court in Willy, for example,
applied the analysis from Christianson to a case involving a state law
wrongful discharge claim premised upon both state and federal
statutes. 60 The Willy court held that the claim did not arise under
federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because state law was
implicated in each theory supporting the plaintiff s wrongful discharge
claim. 161
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. For instance, in
Rains v. Criterion Systems,' 6 the Ninth Circuit relied upon Willy and
Christianson to hold that a plaintiff can allege a violation of the policy
against religious discrimination expressed in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)163 as part of a state law wrongful
discharge claim"s without converting the claim into one arising
under federal law. 6  The plaintiff in Rains brought suit in state
court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 166 after his
158. Id. at 810; see also Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171 (discussing Christianson).
159. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09; see also Rains v. Criterion Supp., 80 F.3d 339, 346
(9th Cir. 1996) (observing that "the same approach [to analyzing whether a controversy arises
under patent law for purposes of § 1338] applies in determining general federal question
jurisdiction"); Ames, supra note 37, at 1234 n.28; but cf. Enders v. American Patent Search Co.,
535 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that "the 'arising under' language in section 1338
should be construed more strictly than the same language in section 1331").
160. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171; see also Ames, supra note 37, at 1235; Korb, 707 F. Supp. at
67-68.
161. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171.
162. 80 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981); see Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1284
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S, 1039 (1978).
164. See, e.g., Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303-04 (Or. 1984)
(recognizing a state law wrongful discharge claim premised upon the public policy expressed in
Title VII in part because the remedies provided for in Title VII were deemed to be inadequate).
165. Rains, 80 F.3d at 341-42, 345-47.
166. California, where Rains arose, first recognized a wrongful discharge claim premised
upon the public policy exception to the employment at will rule in Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). The California Supreme Court has
indicated that, in order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must show that the employer
violated a fundamental public policy "delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions." Gantt
v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992).
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employment was terminated for what he characterized as "refusing to
adopt the ... religious opinions" of a representative of one of the
employer's major clients.167 The employer removed the case to
federal court and the district court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment. 1
68
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit raised the question of whether the
district court had properly exercised jurisdiction, noting that the
threshold issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs wrongful
discharge claim arose under federal law.169 Citing Christianson, the
Ninth Circuit stated, "[w]hen a claim can be supported by alternative
and independent theories--one of which is a state law theory and one
of which is a federal law theory-federal question jurisdiction does not
attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim."1'70
Applying that proposition to the facts before it, the Rains court
noted that the plaintiff had invoked public policies expressed in Title
VII, the California Constitution,'71 and the California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act (CFEHA)'72 in support of his wrongful
167. Rains, 80 F.3d at 342. The court stated that "California law is clear that state public
policy forbids employment discrimination on the basis of religion." Id. at 346; see also CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1992) ("It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state that
it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain,
and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of... religious creed .
168. Rains, 80 F.3d at 342. Although the basis for the district court's summary judgment
ruling is not explained in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the district court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiffs discharge resulted from his failure
to adopt the representative's religious beliefs because, at the time of its decision to discharge the
plaintiff, the employer was unaware of his religious conversation with the representative on which
the plaintiffs public policy claim was based. Rains v. Criterion Sys., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1660, 1668-69 (E.D. Cal. 1993), vacated and remanded, 80 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996). See
generally Byrd v. Johnson, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1651, 1668 (D.D.C. 1983) ("In order
to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must ... demonstrate that
he . . . communicated his [religious] belief to his . . . employer.").
169. Rains, 80 F.3d at 342-43.
170. Id. at 346.
171. The plaintiffs complaint cited Article I, Section 8 and Article I, Section 2 of the
California Constitution. Rains, 80 F.3d at 346 n.8 . Although the relevance of the latter provision
is unclear, the former states, in pertinent part: "A person may not be disqualified from entering
or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of ... creed .... " CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 8. The California Supreme Court has stated that "article I, section 8 ...
unquestionably reflects a fundamental public policy against discrimination in employment .... "
Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis omitted); see also David B. Oppenheimer
& Margaret M. Baumgartner, Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge: Does the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act Displace Common Law Remedies?, 23 U.S.F. L. REV.
145, 189 (1989).
172. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12966 (West 1992). The Ninth Circuit had previously
held that the CFEHA "establishes a California public policy against religious discrimination in
the workplace." Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1990). In the same
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discharge claim.173 The court noted that both the California Consti-
tution and the CFEHA prohibit employment discrimination on the
basis of religion.'74 Because state law "independently espouse[d] the
same public policy established by Title VII," the federal act was not
a necessary element of the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim.' In
short, even though the claim was supported by a federal theory, the
district court lacked federal question jurisdiction because the claim was
"also supported by an independent state theory."' 76  The court
explained that holding in the following terms:
Rains' wrongful termination action, like that of the plaintiff in
Willy, can be supported by an independent state theory as well as
by a federal theory. In fact, Rains' claim that he was wrongfully
terminated in violation of public policy is supported by three
alternative theories-one for each of the three sources of law he cites
to establish that his termination was in violation of public policy.
Only one theory, that which invokes Title VII to establish the
public policy, clearly rests on-a federal theory.... Thus, under
Christianson, federal jurisdiction does not lie. 77
case, however, the court held that a wrongful discharge claim premised upon that public policy
is preempted by the CFEHA "because the California legislature intended the statute to be the
exclusive remedy for a discriminatory wrongful discharge." Id.
173. Rains, 80 F.3d at 343, 345-46.
174. The correctness of the conclusion that the California Constitution prohibits religious
discrimination in private employment is not dear. Although the Ninth Circuit asserted that
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution "explicitly prohibits such discrimination," id. at 346, and
the California Supreme Court had previously interpreted that provision to "forbid[] disqualifica-
tion of employees for religious practices," Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence,
593 P.2d 852, 856 (Cal. 1979), the provision may not apply to private employers. See Rojo, 801
P.2d at 389; Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 1, 33 (1991); but cf. Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal.
1982) (stating, in dictum, that "art. I, § 8 ... covers private as well as state action"). In addition,
Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, which guarantees the "[flree exercise and
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference," CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4, has been
interpreted to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of religion, see Mandel v. Hodges,
127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 256-58 (Ct. App. 1976), but it also may not apply to private employers, see
id. at 257. However, because the CFEHA prohibits religious discrimination in private
employment, see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-21, 12940 (West 1992), the court's interpretation
of the California Constitution is not essential to its ultimate holding. See Rains, 80 F.3d at 345
("The invocation of Title VII does not confer federal question jurisdiction when the plaintiff also
invokes a state constitutional provision or a state statute that can and does serve the same
purpose.") (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 345.
176. Id. at 347.
177. Id. Referring briefly to Merrell Dow, the court indicated that its analysis was not
altered by the fact that Title VII creates a private right of action. Id. at 347 n.10. The court read
Merrell Dow as supporting its conclusion that "even if the federal law incorporated into a state
law claim creates a private right of action, the federal interest may still prove insufficiently
substantial to confer federal-question jurisdiction" when the claim is "supported by an alternate
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A similar analysis appears in Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers.7 '
The plaintiffs in Drake were employees of a Wyoming newspaper.
After being discharged for refusing to wear anti-union buttons during
a unionization campaign, the plaintiffs brought suit in Wyoming state
court.179  They claimed that they were wrongfully discharged in
violation of public policy80 for exercising their right to free speech
under the United States and Wyoming constitutions.18" '
The newspaper removed the case to federal court, alleging that the
plaintiffs' reliance upon the First Amendment to support their
wrongful discharge claims182 created federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.183 The plaintiffs moved to remand, claim-
ing that the matter did not fall within the court's federal question
jurisdiction. 84
The Drake court noted that, as in Merrell Dow, federal law had
not "created" the plaintiffs' cause of action.' Instead, the federal
issue in both cases was merely an element of a state law cause of
action.'86 Although the court acknowledged that federal jurisdiction
may exist where the vindication of a state right depends on the
construction of federal law, it concluded that the analysis in Merrell
Dow compelled the conclusion that the plaintiffs' reliance on the First
Amendment was too insubstantial to confer federal question jurisdic-
theory that does not depend on federal law." Id.
178. 842 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Wyo. 1994).
179. Id. at 1405. There has been considerable litigation over the wearing of union buttons
during union organizational campaigns. See Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 700-02
(9th Cir. 1981).
180. The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized a tort action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy in Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985).
181. Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1405.
182. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First
Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 341, 342 & n.6
(1994) (advocating use of the First Amendment "as a source of public policy in wrongful
discharge actions under state law"). The Drake plaintiffs' reliance upon the First Amendment
in the context of their refusal to wear anti-union buttons undoubtedly was premised upon the
proposition that "the right to remain silent in the face of an illegitimate demand for speech is as
much a part of First Amendment protections as the right to speak out in the face of an
illegitimate demand for silence." Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); see also Loekle v. Hansen, 551 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("[T]he first amendment protects both a right to speak and a right not to speak.").
183. Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1405.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1411.
186. Id.; cf. Bingham, supra note 182, at 366 ("[A] private employer's deprivation of [an]
employee's First Amendment rights has its source in a state-created right or privilege ....").
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tion.'87 The plaintiffs could have ignored the First Amendment and
relied exclusively on a comparable provision of the Wyoming
Constitution188 without compromising their chances of recovery. 9'
Therefore, the court held that federal question jurisdiction would be
extended too far by allowing reliance upon the First Amendment as a
source of public policy to support its implementation. 9 °
The Arizona district court reached a similar result in Wozniak v.
City of Scottsdale.' The plaintiff in Wozniak commenced an action
in state court against her former employer asserting a state law claim
for wrongful discharge. During the course of discovery, she asserted
that the employer had violated public policy by monitoring a telephone
conversation in contravention of a state statute'9 2 and the federal
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Crime
Control Act).'93
187. Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1410. Ironically, federal question jurisdiction may have existed
in Drake under the preemption theory, because a discharge for the reasons alleged in that case
undoubtedly would violate § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1988). See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 894 (1976) (discharge for
wearing pro-union button violated § 8(a)(3)). See generally Chavez v. Copper State Rubber, 897
P.2d 725, 731-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (wrongful discharge claim premised upon the contention
that the plaintiff was terminated for refusing to treat nonunion employees more favorably than
union employees was preempted by the NLRA).
188. See WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("Every person may speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for abuse of that right.. ").
189. Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1412. Significantly, the free speech provision of the Wyoming
Constitution has been described as "broader than that found in the First Amendment." Tate v.
Akers, 409 F. Supp. 978, 981 (D. Wyo. 1976), affd, 565 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1977). Among
other things, the Drake court observed that "the plain language of [the Wyoming] provision
confers an affirmative right to 'speak, write and publish' upon the citizens of [Wyoming], whereas
the First Amendment, read literally, does not actually confer an affirmative right but rather
protects against governmental infringement of that right." Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1406 n.4.
190. Id. at 1412; see also Korb, 707 F. Supp. at 68-70 (reaching a conclusion similar to that
in Drake based, in part, upon the fact that "free expression is a matter of both federal and state
law"). On remand, the Drake plaintiffs' wrongful discharge claims were dismissed by a state trial
court, and the dismissal was upheld by the Wyoming Supreme Court on the ground that
"[tierminating an at-will employee for exercising his right to free speech by refusing to follow a
legal directive of an employer on the employer's premises during working hours does not violate
public policy." Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 891 P.2d 80, 82 (Wyo. 1995); cf. Rigsby v.
Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,768, at 81,437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
191. 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1471 (D. Ariz. 1994).
192. The state statute provided, in pertinent part, that "a person is guilty of a ... felony
who... [i~ntentionaly intercepts a wire or electronic communication ... or aids, authorizes,
employs, procures or permits another to so do, without the consent of either a sender or receiver
thereof." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005.A(1) (1989).
193. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976); cf. Hineline v. Stroudsburg Elec. Supply Co., 586 A.2d
455, 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (discussing a wrongful discharge claim based on the public policies
set forth in state and federal wiretap statutes where the plaintiff claimed to have been terminated
"due to [his] disconnection of [the employer's] allegedly illegal electronic surveillance system").
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The employer removed the case to federal court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446(b)'94 on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,' because the plaintiff relied
upon the Omnibus Crime Control Act to support her claim. 96 The
plaintiff then moved to remand the case to state court.'97
The district court noted that the Arizona Supreme Court had
adopted the public policy exception to the employment at will rule in
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital.'98 Under Wagenseller,
Arizona's public policy can be found in its constitution, statutory law,
and prior judicial decisions.' Th court noted that wrongful
discharge claims premised upon the public policy exception originate
under state law.2°° Further, the court observed that the employer in
this case was not contending that the Omnibus Crime Control Act
preempted the plaintiffs claim.2"' Instead, removal was based upon
194. Addressing the fact that the plaintiff had not invoked the Omnibus Crime Control Act
in her original complaint, the court observed that "28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) allows a defendant to
remove a case to federal court based upon papers filed after the initial pleading." Wozniak, 9
Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1471 n.1. Specifically, the statute provides:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be
filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable ....
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
195. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1471-72.
196. Among other things, the Omnibus Crime Control Act prohibits persons from
"intentionally intercept[ing] ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(a).
197. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rt. Cas. (BNA) at 1472.
198. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The Arizona Court of Appeals had adopted the public
policy exception in Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 704 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985), one month before Wagenseller was decided, see Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1033, and had
indicated a willingness to adopt the exception several years prior to that, in Larsen v. Motor
Supply Co., 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
199. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472. The precise statement to which
the Wozniak court was referring is: "[W]e will look to the pronouncements of our founders, our
legislature, and our courts to discern the public policy of this state." Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at
1034.
200. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472; cf. Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
565 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Hedges v. Legal Servs. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 300, 304
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Patricia A. Konopka, Comment, Combatting Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace Without Risking a Wrongful Discharge Lawsuit: An Employer's Dilemma?, 42 KAN. L.
REV. 437, 440 (1994).
201. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472; cf. Arizona v. Politte, 664 P.2d 661,
671 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that "the Arizona wiretap statutes withstand the claim of
preemption"). See generally Navarra v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 510 F. Supp. 831, 833
(E.D. Mich. 1981) ("[In enacting the Omnibus Crime Control Act], the Senate indicated that
state law was also applicable in civil penalties for wiretapping offenses. Its report states, 'The
scope of the remedy is intended to be both comprehensive and exclusive, but there is no intent
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the contention that the case presented a federal question because the
plaintiff had relied upon the public policy expressed in the Omnibus
Crime Control Act to support her wrongful discharge claim." 2 The
court indicated that removal was not barred by the holding in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson °3 because the federal act provided
for a private cause of action for persons whose communications were
illegally intercepted." 4
The court nevertheless granted the plaintiffs motion to remand,
finding no federal question jurisdiction.05 It distinguished Olguin v.
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.2" 6 because the plaintiff in Olguin
had not relied "at all" on state law,207 but instead had asserted that
he was discharged for complaining about mine safety conditions and
participating in labor activities governed by the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act 8 and the National Labor Relations Act" respec-
tively.210 Therefore, the Wozniak court concluded that Olguin had
been properly removed on federal question grounds. "
In contrast, the plaintiff in Wozniak had cited both state and
federal statutes in support of her wrongful discharge claim.212 The
state statute, the court concluded, was sufficient in and of itself to
establish a public policy against intercepting telephone conversations
to preempt parallel State law."') (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted
in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2196 (1968)).
202. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472. Whether the conduct at issue in
Wozniak actually would support a wrongful discharge claim under Arizona law-a question the
court was not asked to decide-is questionable. See, e.g., Smemo-Rosenquist v. Meredith Corp.,
46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 531, 533 (D. Ariz. 1988) (no wrongful discharge claim could be
maintained where "plaintiff was not asked to participate in any illegality or ... terminated for
refusing to conceal an arguably illegal act ... and plaintiff did not attempt to correct problems
of public interest") (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other grounds, No. 88-2569, 1990
WL 74784 (9th Cir. June 5, 1990).
203. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
204. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472. Specifically, the Omnibus Crime
Control Act states that "any person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is intercepted
... in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which
engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (1976).
205. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472.
206. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
207. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472; cf. Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co.,
826 F.2d 857, 863 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987).
208. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
209. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
210. See Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1476; Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472
(discussing Olguin).
211. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472.
212. Id. at 1471-72.
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without the participants' consent.213  Thus, while the Omnibus
Crime Control Act also prohibits the interception of wire or electronic
communications,214 it was not essential to the plaintiffs wrongful
discharge claim.21 ' The plaintiffs right to relief under state law
therefore did not depend upon the resolution of a substantial question
of federal law, and the case was not removable on federal question
grounds.2 1
6
A district court in Oklahoma reached a similar conclusion in
Heckelmann v. Piping Cos. 217  The plaintiff in Heckelmann was sixty-
three years old when the defendant terminated his employment and
hired a younger replacement. 28  The plaintiff brought suit in state
court for wrongful discharge, alleging that his termination violated the
public policy of Oklahoma29 as well as the federal public policy
represented by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).220
The employer sought to remove the case to federal court, arguing
that the plaintiffs reliance upon the public policy reflected in the
ADEA created federal question jurisdiction. 2 1  The plaintiff cited,
among other things, his own failure to invoke the administrative
procedures applicable under the ADEA 222 to argue that federal
jurisdiction was lacking because his claim arose under Oklahoma
common law, not the ADEA.223
213. Id. at 1472. The statute "general[ly] prohibit[s] ... interception of communications,"
but authorizes the "[m]onitoring and recording of a telephone conversation with the consent of
one party." Arizona v. Allgood, 831 P.2d 1290, 1291-92 & n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
214. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
215. Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472.
216. Id.; cf. Bally v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that federal
jurisdiction does not exist where state law "provides a remedy for interference with rights created
by both federal and state law").
217. 904 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
218. Id. at 1259.
219. The plaintiff based his claim upon Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla.
1989), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court "adopt[ed] . . . the public policy exception to the
at-will termination rule in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear
mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law."
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
221. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1259-60.
222. An individual intending to bring suit under the ADEA may not do so without first
filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and then waiting sixty days to allow the EEOC to attempt to conciliate the daim informally. 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988).
223. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1260. The failure to invoke administrative procedures
now appears to preclude a plaintiff from pursuing a common law wrongful discharge claim in
Oklahoma. In Atkinson v. Halliburton Co., 905 P.2d 772, (Okla. 1995), decided three months
after Heckelmann, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an individual seeking to assert a
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The court observed that the plaintiff merely relied upon the public
policy set forth in the ADEA, instead of bringing an action directly
under that act. Therefore, it was state law rather than federal law that
had "created" his cause of action.224 The court considered whether
federal jurisdiction nevertheless existed because the plaintiffs claim
depended upon the construction of federal law. 25 Additionally, the
court noted that Congress had provided for a direct private federal
cause of action under the ADEA.226 The court therefore concluded
that while a finding that federal jurisdiction existed was not precluded
by Merrell Dow,227 "[i]n instances in which a private federal remedy
does exist, the ultimate question under Merrell Dow is whether
Congress intended that ... an action ... based on state law but
incorporating a violation of federal law ... be brought in federal
cour.,,228
Finally, the court held that even though federal precedents
interpreting the ADEA might provide guidance in analyzing the
wrongful discharge claim, this did not transform the claim into one
arising under federal law.2 9 Oklahoma had "chosen to replicate" the
wrongful discharge claim under Oklahoma law "must first exhaust his administrative remedies."
Id. at 777. See generally M.E. Knack, Note, Do State Fair Employment Statutes by "Negative
Implication" Preclude Common-Law Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on the Public Policy
Exception?, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 537 (1991) ("Because of... limited remedies found
in... statutes, [plaintiffs] have in the last decade attempted to circumvent administrative agency
proceedings by stating a common law claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy
exception.").
224. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1260. The court explained that "[i]t is the Burk decision
which permits a cause of action based upon violation of public policy." Id.; cf. MacGill v. Johns
Hopkins Univ., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1254, 1258 (D. Md. 1983) ("The civil law
remedy ... for [a wrongful] discharge does not seek to enforce the ... statute ..., nor regulate
activities thereunder; it seeks to foster and promote the policy of that law.").
225. The court noted that the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by
federal law because "the ADEA does not preempt state laws permitting recovery for age
discrimination." Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1261; but cf. Howard v. Daiichiya-Love's Bakery,
714 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (D. Haw. 1989) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim was preempted
by the ADEA). See generally Bailey v. Container Corp., 594 F. Supp. 629, 633 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(observing that "there is no clear statement [in the ADEA] of Congressional intent to preempt
... and nothing inherent in the nature of age discrimination which requires federal preeminence
.o 1).
226. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1988).
227. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
228. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1261-62 (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems.
Co., 29 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1994)).
229. Id. at 1262. Cf. Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989):
[A] claim for wrongful discharge based on age discrimination does not rest on the
violation of any state or federal civil rights statutes. An employee's right not to be
discharged on the basis of age is a common law right based upon public policy and is
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federal remedies available under the ADEA in the Oklahoma Anti-
Discrimination Act,23° and an action under the state act "remain[s]
[a] state remed[y], notwithstanding the existence of the ADEA.
' 231
Because the plaintiff had only relied in part upon the ADEA, and the
Oklahoma act also made it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of
age,232 federal jurisdiction over the state law wrongful discharge claim
did not exist.233
2. Prohibiting Removal of Wrongful Discharge Claims Supported
by State and Federal Public Policies Is Questionable
The analysis of federal question jurisdiction in the cases discussed
in the preceding section is inconsistent with the analysis traditionally
used by courts in determining whether federal question jurisdiction
exists. Accordingly, prohibiting the removal of wrongful discharge
claims simply because they are based upon both state and federal
public policies is a questionable practice.2s
While a plaintiff who has invoked both state and federal law
obviously may prevail on the state law theory alone,23 the potential
"surplusage" of a federal issue traditionally has not precluded a finding
of federal jurisdiction.236 Moreover, denying an employer the right
to remove because the plaintiff may not prevail on the federal theory
is at odds with the long-settled rule that the presence of federal
independent of any rights accruing under either state or federal civil rights statutes.
Although no federal statutes are involved .. , we believe that federal cases interpreting
the Age Discrimination [in] Employment Act... are instructive.
(authority omitted).
230. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1101-1901 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); cf. Helman v.
AMF, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (discussing an Indiana statute that the
court interpreted as reflecting a state legislative intent for "the ADEA to provide adequate
remedies in most circumstances and the state statute [to] be invoked in others").
231. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1262.
232. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (A)(1).
233. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1262.
234. That may be particularly true where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
claims brought directly under the statute expressing the federal public policy at issue. Cf. infra
notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
235. See Willy, 855 F.2d at 1170; Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472; Drake,
842 F. Supp. at 1412.
236. See Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross, 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980) (finding that federal jurisdiction existed even though the case could
have been decided "solely on state law precepts" and the plaintiffs reliance upon federal law was
"unnecessary for the ultimate disposition of the case," because the "surplusage of federal claims
in the pleadings is not the test"); Valentini v. Practice Management Assoc., No. 91-C-6963, 1991
WL 262893, at *1 (N.D. I11. Dec. 9, 1991) ("A state court action is removable whenever it
contains a claim that arises under federal law, even if the federal claim is asserted in the
alternative or as 'surplus."').
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question jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the record existing
at the time the removal petition is filed.237 The proper inquiry
therefore would focus on whether, as drafted and filed in the state
court, the complaint may require the construction of a federal statute,
rather than on how the complaint might otherwise have been drafted
or on what theory eventually might be relied upon at trial. 3
Nevertheless, the analysis in Christianson appears to preclude the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in wrongful discharge cases premised
upon both state and federal public policies. Thus, only wrongful
discharge claims based exclusively upon federal laws creating private
federal rights of action appear to be potentially removable; 239 the
removal of wrongful discharge claims based on both state and federal
public policies, or upon federal public policies for which there is no
private federal right of action, appears to be precluded by Christianson
and Merrell Dow.240
3. Jurisdiction Where Federal Public Policy Provides the Sole
Basis for the Claim
Willy, Rains, Drake, Wozniak, and Heckelmann still do not resolve
all aspects of the question of whether a wrongful discharge claim
premised solely upon a public policy reflected in federal law providing
a private federal judicial remedy raises a federal question under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.241 In order to support a finding of federal jurisdiction
237. Westmoreland, 605 F.2d at 123-24.
238. Id. Significantly, the plaintiff in Christianson actually prevailed on a federal theory. See
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 811 (1988).
239. See Wozniak, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 1472 (suggesting that a wrongful
discharge claim may be removable where an underlying federal public policy is "essential to [the]
cause of action").
240. This result is not without its critics. One commentator has stated, for example, that
"it is far from clear why the absence of liability under federal law ... necessarily suggest[s] the
absence of federal jurisdiction to hear a state claim presenting ... a federal issue." Luneburg,
supra note 87, at 765.
241. However, the analysis in Willy suggests that federal public policies underlying wrongful
discharge claims cannot give rise to federal jurisdiction even in the absence of alternative state law
theories, because the "claim as a whole... is in essence one under state law." Willy, 855 F.2d
at 1171. The same view was expressed in Garg v. Narron, 710 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (S.D. Tex.
1989), where the court stated:
[A] wrongful discharge claim is not one that arises under federal law for purposes of
section 1331. In order for a state claim to arise under federal law, vindication of the
state right must turn on some construction of federal law. Additionally, the federal
issues must be in the forefront of the case rather than collateral in nature. The Texas
common law doctrine enunciated in Sabine is intended to protect the rights of any
employee who is fired for refusing to violate any law. It does not matter that the law
that the employee would not violate is state or federal.... Under Sabine, the role of
issues of federal law is more collateral than in the forefront. Thus, there is no federal
1996]
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under Merrell Dow, not only must a federal statute be a necessary
element of the plaintiffs state law cause of action, but the resulting
federal issue must be "substantial. '24 2 Where the only public policy
invoked in support of a state law wrongful discharge claim is contained
in a federal statute, the federal statute undoubtedly is a necessary
element of the claim.243 Whether the federal issue created thereby
is sufficiently substantial to satisfy Merrell Dow is less clear. 2 "
Lyster v. First Nationwide Bank Financial Corp.24" discussed
Merrell Dow's substantiality requirement in the wrongful discharge
context. The plaintiff in Lyster asserted a wrongful discharge claim in
state court contending that he was discharged for reporting banking
violations to the Office of Thrift Supervision. 24 ' The employer
removed the case to federal court, alleging that the claim raised a
substantial federal question247 under the "whistleblower" provision
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA),248 which provides a civil remedy to individuals
punished for reporting misconduct at federally-regulated financial
institutions. 249  FIRREA was the only law supporting the plaintiffs
allegation that his discharge violated public policy.250 The employer
contended that the availability of a private federal remedy under
FIRREA 251  reflected a congressional conclusion that the alleged
question jurisdiction that can be used as a basis for removal.
(authorities and internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1168-69.
243. See id. at 1169.
244. See id. Justice Brennan has indicated that the requirement of a "substantial" federal
issue is "simply another way of stating that the federal question must be colorable and have a
reasonable foundation." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 823 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. 829 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
246. Id. at 1164-65, 1167.
247. See id. at 1164, 1166.
248. The statute provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o insured depository institution may
discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee... because the employee... provided
information to any Federal Banking agency or to the Attorney General regarding any possible
violation of any law or regulation by the depository institution . 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a)(1)
(1989).
249. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1166.
250. Id. at 1169. It is not altogether dear that the public policy expressed in FIRREA
supports a common law wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g., Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866
F. Supp. 1191, 1213 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
251. Specifically, the statute states that "[a]ny employee or former employee who believes
he has been discharged or discriminated against in violation of subsection (a) of this section may
file a civil action in the appropriate United States district court . 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(b)
(1989).
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violation of the statute as an element of a state law wrongful discharge
action is sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction.2"2
The court disagreed. Among other things, it concluded that
Merrell Dow's "substantiality" requirement is not necessarily satisfied
if the federal statute being invoked is the only example of public policy
on which the wrongful discharge claim is based. The court offered
little explanation for its holding,2"3 but merely observed that because
the plaintiff is "master to decide what law he will rely upon,"254 a
provision for a private federal cause of action allows the plaintiff to
bring a federal case, but does not deprive him of the right to sue under
state law alone.255
In contrast, the court in Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers25 6
suggested that a state law wrongful discharge claim would involve a
substantial issue of federal law if the interpretation of a federal statute
on which the claim was premised would be "determinative of the
resulting judgment.""2 7  In other words, federal jurisdiction would
exist if resolution of a federal issue would be "necessary to the
outcome" of the wrongful discharge claim.25 8
4. The Propriety of Removing Wrongful Disclosure Claims Based
Solely Upon Federal Public Policies
It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of a state law claim
involving a substantial federal question than one in which a federal
252. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1168.
253. Id. Ironically, federal jurisdiction may have existed in Lyster on the alternative ground
that the plaintiff s wrongful discharge claim was preempted by FIRREA. See Walleri v. Federal
Home Loan Bank, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 59 (D. Or. 1993).
254. Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1169 (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22, 25 (1913)).
255. Id.; cf. Ames, supra note 37, at 1237 n.47:
The situation might have been different had [the plaintiff] sought to invoke federal
jurisdiction. But he did not. As "master to decide what law he will rely upon," The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913), [the plaintiffs] decision to file
a state law claim in ... state court should end the matter.
(discussing Willy).
256. 842 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Wyo. 1994).
257. Id. at 1412 (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th
Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979)); see also Bally v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.
Mass. 1988) ("Federal jurisdiction exists only where an issue of federal law is essential to
plaintiffs claim; it does not exist where no more can be shown than that a federal context is
relevant to that claim.").
258. Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1413. This formulation of the test for federal jurisdiction is
consistent with the observation in Merrell Dow that a suit does not arise under federal law "unless
it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction
or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends." Merrell Dow, 478
U.S. at 814 n.12 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912)).
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statute provides the only available support for the state law claim.5 9
Because the key to resolving a wrongful discharge claim lies in defining
the public policy alleged to have been violated by the employer's
conduct, 260 interpreting and applying federal law is necessary to the
outcome of a wrongful discharge claim based solely on federal public
policy.26 1 In this context, the removability of state law wrongful
discharge claims has serious federalism implications. Specifically, the
resolution of a wrongful discharge claim premised solely upon the
public policy expressed in a federal law requires the court to determine
whether the federal law creates a duty,262 and if so, the nature of the
duty and whether the employer's conduct constitutes a breach of the
duty.26 3 Such an interpretation of federal law appears to be "a clear
example of 'a substantial dispute over the effect of federal law' where
'the result turns on the federal question.' "264
In short, because the viability of a claim for wrongful discharge
typically depends upon whether the employer has violated the public
policy embodied in a particular statute, a substantial portion of the
claim would involve interpreting that statute. 265 The fact that the
259. However defined, there is little doubt that the "substantiality" prong of the Merrell Dow
test is satisfied in at least some cases where a federal statute is invoked as an element of a state
law claim. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One federal judge has
concluded that where a cause of action depends upon whether the employer has violated the
public policy embodied in a statute, the claim presents a substantial question under that statute.
See Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, 16 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 1994) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
260. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1032. The court in Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684, stated:
[Diespite its broad acceptance, the principle underlying the public policy exception is
more easily stated than applied. The difficulty ... lies in determining where and how
to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve matters of public policy, and
those that concern merely ordinary disputes between employer and employee. This
determination depends in large part on whether the public policy alleged is sufficiently
clear to provide the basis for such a potent remedy.
261. See, e.g., Drake, 842 F. Supp. at 1412 (suggesting that removal of a state law wrongful
discharge claim premised upon the public policy exception may be appropriate where the plaintiff
must rely on federal law "as [the] source of public policy").
262. Because a plaintiff asserting a wrongful discharge claim premised upon a federal public
policy must prove that he or she was discharged for refusing to violate a duty imposed by federal
law, the court considering such a claim would be required to decide issues of federal law. Buethe
v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984); but cf. Donofry v. Nazareth Hosp.,
721 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (concluding, without explanation, that "a court will not
have to pass upon the validity, construction, or effect of [a federal statute]" where the statute "is
used ... only as [a] source of public policy"). See generally Twitchell, supra note 24, at 820.
263. Utley, 625 F. Supp. at 106.
264. Id. (quoting Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1365-66
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982)).
265. In Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, 16 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 1994) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting), for example, Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner noted that because a claim for wrongful
discharge premised upon Illinois' workers' compensation laws "looks to whether the employer has
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statute is federal should be sufficient to give rise to federal question
jurisdiction.2 66  That conclusion is particularly compelling where the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the private federal cause
of action created by the statute.267 The federal interest presumably
is strongest where Congress has given the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over the direct statutory cause of action.26
This point is illustrated by cases in which the federal public policy
upon which a wrongful discharge claim is based is set forth in Title
VII. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Yellow Freight Systems
v. Donnelly,2 69  federal courts were presumed to have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising under Title VII.270 Nevertheless, the
public policy underlying Title VII was often invoked in support of
common law wrongful discharge claims asserted in both state27' and
federal courts.272 Denying employers the right to remove such claims
is contrary to a congressional intent to make federal jurisdiction over
claims brought directly under the statute exclusive,273 therefore
raising serious federalism concerns.2 74 At a minimum, therefore,
employers should be entitled to remove state law wrongful discharge
claims premised solely upon public policies reflected in federal statutes
that provide for private federal statutory causes of action over which
violated a policy embodied in the statute," either "the Illinois workmen's compensation laws create
[the] cause of action or, at the very least, [the] claim presents a substantial, disputed question
under those laws."
266. See, e.g., Bally v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D. Mass. 1988) (observing that a case
may arise under federal law where "federal law supplies the substantive right for which a remedy
exists under [state law]").
267. Almanza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
268. See, e.g., Chivas Prods. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988).
269. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
270. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e- 17 (1981). See, e.g., Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805
F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1986); but cf. Greene v. County Sch. Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 45 (E.D. Va.
1981) ("The language of Title VII neither expressly nor by necessary implication vests the federal
courts with exclusive jurisdiction.").
271. See, e.g., Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. 1989); Holien v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984).
272. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988); Savage v.
Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985).
273. See Grafv. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[A] state
cannot be allowed, merely by the label it attaches to the cause of action, to interfere with the
administration of a federal statute."); Knack, supra note 223, at 544 (1991).
274. See Twitchell, supra note 24, at 827 n.79. This analysis obviously assumes that federal
jurisdiction over the "direct" statutory claim is in fact exclusive, which is no longer the case under
Title VII. See Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
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the federal courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction by Con-
gress.27
5
The point is supported by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals'
decision in Weyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Seidl.276  The
plaintiff in Weyenberg had been employed by the defendant as an
accountant. 277  Approximately three weeks before his discharge, he
was ordered to report to national guard training camp. Prior to leaving
for duty, the plaintiff informed two coworkers that he would be absent
from work. At the conclusion of guard camp he returned to work and
was informed that his employment had been terminated for failing to
advise his supervisor of his whereabouts. 78
When the employer sued the plaintiff to recover the balance due
on a promissory note, the plaintiff counterclaimed, 279 alleging a
federal claim under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance
Act (VEVRA),280 and a state law claim for wrongful discharge
premised upon a contravention of public policy.28' For the latter
claim, the plaintiff argued that the public policy embodied in VEVRA
"prohibits the firing of an employee for performing an obligation to
serve in the national guard.
282
The trial court concluded that federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising under VEVRA.283 The plaintiff
revised his complaint, invoking a state statute in support of his
275. Cf. Heckelmann, 904 F. Supp. at 1261-62. See generally Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F.
Supp. 639, 643 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (observing that courts should be particularly concerned with the
"circumvention of [federal] jurisdiction by a state court plaintiff' who "disguises his complaint
so that it hides a claim that rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts").
276. 410 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
277. Id. at 606.
278. Id. The supervisor had received advance notice of the plaintiffs absence from the
coworkers to whom the plaintiff had reported it directly. Id.
279. Id. at 607.
280. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982). The pertinent portion of VEVRA provides that an
individual "shall not be denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or
advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the
Armed Forces." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982). That statute "has been applied to protect
reservists in [the] performance of a variety of military reserve duties." Beattie v. Trump Shuttle,
Inc., 758 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 563
(1981) (authorities omitted)).
281. Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 607. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had adopted the
public policy exception to the employment at will rule in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
282. Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 607.
283. Id. This conclusion begs the question of whether a state law wrongful discharge claim
premised upon the public policy embodied in VEVRA arises under that act for jurisdictional
purposes.
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wrongful discharge claim in order to remain in state court.284 The
case was tried in state court under the latter theory,"' and the jury
found that the plaintiff had been wrongfully terminated for participat-
ing in national guard exercises.2"6
On appeal, the court concluded that the jury's verdict could not
be sustained under the theory on which it was based, in part because
the pertinent state statute did not apply to an employee absent from
work for national guard training.287 The court nevertheless affirmed
the judgment under the federal theory the trial court had rejected,88
noting that both the evidence and the jury findings supported an award
under the federal statute.28 9 In reaching that result, the court rejected
the trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over claims based
upon VEVRA, holding that state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over such claims. 2
90
284. Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 607, citing WIS. STAT. § 45.50 (1987). As a further,
alternative basis for its dismissal of the plaintiff's original wrongful discharge claim, the court had
concluded that "the state law wrongful discharge theory must be based upon violation of state
public policy as evidenced by state law." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the
Wisconsin courts now appear to subscribe to the view that wrongful discharge claims can be
premised upon public policies reflected in both state and federal statutes. See, e.g., Sampson v.
Bissen Co., 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) $ 10,720, at 28,120 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
285. The relevant state statute provided, in pertinent part, that any person who leaves a
position in private employment for "active service" in the U.S. armed forces or to perform
national defense work during a national emergency shall, upon return, "be restored to such
position or to a position of like seniority, status, pay and salary advancement as though his service
... had not been interrupted by such absence." Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 605-06 n.1 (quoting
WIS. STAT. § 45.50).
286. Id. at 607.
287. Id. at 608. The court also held that under Wisconsin's narrow view of the public policy
exception, an employee must have been terminated for refusing to violate public policy in order
to prevail. Because the plaintiff had not refused to violate public policy, but had merely acted
in accordance with it, the employer's decision to discharge him did not fall within the exception.
Id.; see also Sampson, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 28,120.
288. See Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 607. The court observed that "a judgment may be
affirmed on appeal, even though supported by the lower court on an erroneous theory, where
judgment on the correct theory would be proper," because "[a]n appellate court has the power to
affirm a judgment if the result was correct even if the reasons were wrong." Id. at 608.
289. See id. at 608-10. The affirmance was on the ground that the evidence supported
recovery directly under the federal statute; due to Wisconsin's narrow interpretation of the public
policy exception, the statute did not support a state law wrongful discharge claim premised upon
the public policy reflected in the statute. Id.; Sampson, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 28,120
(discussing Weyenberg). For purposes of the jurisdictional analysis relevant here, however, that
nuance appears to be inconsequential, because the court affirmed on the basis of a jury finding
that the plaintiff had been "wrongfully terminated from his employment contrary to public
policy," which was reached after the jury had been instructed that "[plublic policy in Wisconsin
prohibits firing of an employee for performing an obligation to serve in the Wisconsin National
Guard." Weyenberg, 410 N.W.2d at 610.
290. Id. at 607-10.
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With this holding,29' the Weyenberg court appears to have
accepted the trial court's apparent conclusion that a state court does
not have jurisdiction over a wrongful discharge claim premised upon
the public policy expressed in a federal statute if the federal courts
would have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim asserted directly under
the statute.292 Although it may be extreme to conclude that federal
courts would have had exclusive jurisdiction in this case,293 the
Weyenberg court's analysis suggests that federal courts should at least
have concurrent jurisdiction over wrongful discharge claims premised
upon federal statutes where the federal courts would have jurisdiction
(and particularly exclusive jurisdiction) over claims brought directly
under those statutes. 294  And if the federal courts do share jurisdic-
tion over such wrongful discharge claims, employers are entitled to
remove them to federal court in cases where they are originally brought
in state court.295
There are persuasive policy reasons for permitting the federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law wrongful discharge claims
premised upon federal public policies. The existence of a federal
291. The conclusion that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction under VEVRA
is contrary to the weight of authority. See, e.g., Firemen & Policemen's Pension Fund Bd. of
Trustees v. Lott, 742 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Vietnam ERA Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act
of 1974."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935,
938 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he Senate Report accompanying the 1974 amendment to the statute
shows that Congress wanted veterans... to have their legal rights litigated in the federal courts,
so that their reemployment rights might be determined in such a forum."), cert denied, 441 U.S.
967 (1979).
292. Cf. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 451 (N.C. 1989) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there is no reason to make state forums available for the litigation of
wrongful discharge claims premised on federal public policies where "[a] federal forum already
exists for redress of violations of [the] federal [law]").
293. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The state courts and
legislatures are of course free to incorporate aspects of federal policy into state-created causes of
action. And the states may naturally provide for state court jurisdiction over such claims."). See
generally Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[S]tate courts have inherent authority, and
are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
States.").
294. See generally Luneburg, supra note 87, at 767 ("Permitting original, though concurrent,
jurisdiction in the district courts .. .may mitigate the dangers [of inconsistent state court
interpretations of federal law].").
295. See Warren v. United States, 932 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[A] congressional
grant of concurrent jurisdiction in a statute does not imply that removal is prohibited."); cf.
Alexander by Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 1991)
(rejecting the proposition that "remand is called for [where] the state court is a competent court
to hear the federal claim").
296. Because federal issues provide much of the federal courts' caseload, state courts may
be somewhat less adept at resolving them. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 & n.6 (Brennan, J.,
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statute reflects Congress's determination that there is a federal interest
in requiring litigants to conduct themselves in conformity with the
requirements of the statute.297 Disputes over the proper interpreta-
tion and application of such a statute inevitably arise, and it is the duty
of the courts to resolve those disputes fairly and consistently.
298
Because state courts may be more likely to arrive at inconsistent
interpretations of federal law,299 declining to permit federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction in cases involving the construction and application
of federal statutes undermines these goals.3"' That is true regardless
of whether the federal statute is sued upon directly, or instead is
implicated only as an "element" of a state law claim,3"' and it is
particularly true where federal jurisdiction over claims brought directly
under the statute would be exclusive.0 2
VI. CONCLUSION
An employer against whom a federal claim has been asserted in
state court generally has the right to remove the claim to federal
court.30 3 If a state forum is critical to the plaintiff, he or she can
avoid removal by relying exclusively on state law.304 A plaintiff who
dissenting); see also City of Chicopee v. Sullivan, 379 F. Supp. 569, 572 n.6 (D. Mass. 1974); cf.
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411. 415-16 (1964); Michael B.
Thornton, Comment, Intimations of Federal Removal Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: the Pleadings
Nexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743. 747 (1981). ("State courts are likely to guard federal interests less
zealously than federal courts."); but cf. Enders v. American Patent Search Co., 535 F.2d 1085,
1092 (9th Cir. 1976) (disputing the "supposed greater sympathy of federal judges for the interests
protected by federal statutes").
297. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 826, 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 4
(N.D. Cal. 1986) ("In creating the lower federal courts and vesting in them jurisdiction over all
cases 'arising under' federal law, Congress presumably intended to provide for the uniform
interpretation and application of federal law.").
299. See Luneburg, supra note 87, at 767 (noting that "a state court confronted with a state
cause of action alleging a violation of [a federal statute] could adopt an interpretation that would
... confuse or undercut the intended effect of the [statutory] requirements").
300. See Smith v. Industrial Valley Title Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 90, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Cowen, J., dissenting) (observing that "claims ... which are clearly creatures of federal law,
should not be subjected to the peculiarities of interpretation in fifty different state forums"
because "there is... [an] interest in protecting the integrity of federal... policy through uniform
judicial decisionmaking").
301. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. See Enders, 535 F.2d at 1091 (observing that a "special need for uniformity" is an
"important consideration leading to exclusive jurisdiction").
303. See Austwick v. Board of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 840, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
304. See Ethridge, 861 F.2d at 1395; Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196
(9th Cir. 1988); Lyster, 829 F. Supp. at 1167; see also Spieth v. R & B Appliance Parts, 29 Wage
& Hour Cas. (BNA) 363, 364 (D. Ariz. 1989). See generally Zack Co., 658 F. Supp. at 76.
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elects to pursue a federal claim, however, ordinarily runs the risk of
removal. 3° 5
A plaintiff in a wrongful discharge case should not be permitted
to avoid removal simply because that plaintiff invokes the public policy
underlying a federal statute to support his claim rather than using the
federal statute directly 0 6 Wrongful discharge claims premised upon
public policies embodied in federal statutes implicate essentially the
same concerns that led Congress to create federal jurisdiction over
claims brought directly under those statutes.0 7  Further, courts
generally are hostile to efforts to manipulate the forum in which a case
involving federal issues is heard.30 8
Nevertheless, Merrell Dow and Christianson appear to preclude
removal of a wrongful discharge claim based upon the public policy
expressed in a federal statute if there is no private right of action under
the statute,3" or if there is an alternative public policy embodied in
state law that may support the claim.310  Although the former
limitation on federal jurisdiction may be appropriate,"' the latter
limitation is questionable. 12
A plaintiff who has relied upon both state and federal expressions
of public policy to support a wrongful discharge claim may prevail
305. Austwick, 555 F. Supp. at 842.
306. See Eure, 481 F. Supp. at 643.
307. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Luneburg, supra note 87, at
770 ("[P]leading a federal cause of action based on violation of [a federal statute] would appear
to be indistinguishable from ... alleging a state cause of action which relies on violation of the
[statute] ....").
308. In Espinoza v. Fry's Food Stores, 806 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1990), for example, a
federal district court retained jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiffs had "attempt[ed] to
manipulate remand" by dismissing their federal claim, and the state law claims that remained in
the action "turn[ed] upon interpretations of federal law." Id. at 856-57; cf. Austwick, 555 F. Supp.
at 842 (denying remand where the plaintiffs efforts had "primarily been channeled in assuring
that his claims [were] litigated in state court" because "[t]he tools of removal and remand may
not be manipulated"). See generally Twitchell, supra note 24, at 825.
309. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
311. Because the state law claim at issue in Merrell Dow could have been resolved without
resort to federal law, see Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th
Cir. 1985), affd, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), there is still room to argue that where the resolution of a
federal issue is truly essential to the outcome of a state law wrongful discharge claim, the case is
removable regardless of whether there is a direct private right of action under the pertinent federal
statute. See, e.g., Smith, 957 F.2d at 95 (Cowen, J., dissenting); Clark v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp., 944 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the argument is a tenuous one. See Gray,
874 F. Supp. at 754 ("Manifestly, the Court's decision in Merrell Dow derived principally, if not
exclusively, from the fact that the [federal statute] did not provide a federal right of action for its
violation.").
312. See supra notes 234-238 and accompanying text.
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only because the federal policy is found to have been violated.313
Where the federal courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction over
an action brought directly under the statute embodying the federal
policy,314 a refusal to permit removal of a wrongful discharge claim
based on the statute clearly undermines Congressional intent.
311
Because a defendant generally is entitled to remove a claim where
federal courts have either concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction, a
wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy expressed in a
federal statute should also be removable where the federal courts would
have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim brought directly under the
federal statute.316
Under this analysis, a wrongful discharge claim should be
removable whenever it is based upon the public policy of a federal
statute and the federal courts would have jurisdiction in a case brought
under the federal statute directly.317 At a minimum, a wrongful
discharge claim should be removable where a federal statute creating
a private federal right of action provides the sole expression of public
policy supporting the claim, because that result has not been precluded
by either Christianson or Merrell Dow.
318
313. See, e.g., Weyenberg Shoe Mfg. Co., 410 N.W.2d at 607-10.
314. Some courts have been unwilling to recognize wrongful discharge claims where there
is a direct remedy available under the statute expressing the pertinent public policy. See Tate v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1224 n.21 (Okla. 1992); Chappell v. Southern Md. Hosp.,
578 A.2d 766, 770 (Md. 1990).
315. Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., 638 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986). The Wagner court
dismissed a wrongful discharge claim based upon the public policy expressed in a state statute
because recognition of the claim would have permitted the plaintiff to circumvent the "elaborate
procedural mechanism" established by the statute "by simply filing a claim under the common
law," rather than directly under the statute. Id. at 744 (quoting Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2421 (C.D. Cal. 1984)). One "procedural mechanism" at issue when a
federal statute creates a private cause of action is the right of a defendant sued for violating the
statute to remove the case to federal court. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bakker, 801 F.
Supp. 706, 709 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (characterizing removal as a "procedural matter").
316. See generally Warren, 932 F.2d at 585.
317. See supra notes 292 and 294 and accompanying text.
318. State law wrongful discharge claims premised upon federal public policies are in many
respects analogous to implied private rights of action under federal statutes that do not contain
express remedial provisions. See, e.g., Spearman, 16 F.3d at 732 (Rovner, J., dissenting)
(observing that wrongful discharge daims are "akin to a federal court implying a civil damages
remedy under a federal statute that .. .regulates or criminalizes behavior .. .but [does] not
[provide for] private enforcement of the duties so imposed"); Sanford Street Local Dev. Corp. v.
Textron, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (observing that a state law claim
premised upon the violation of a federal statute "is little different than an implied right of action
under the [statute] for money damages"). An implied civil action of the latter variety arises under
the federal statute upon which it is based for purposes of federal question jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
Enders, 535 F.2d at 1089, and the same presumably should be true of a state law wrongful
discharge claim premised upon the public policy embodied in the statute.
